Recommendations to Reform and
Finance
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Final Superfund Working Group Report New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner John P. Cahill transmitted
to Governor George E. Pataki on June 2, 1999, the final report developed
by the Superfund Working Group. Governor Pataki established the
Superfund Working Group in August of 1998 to develop recommendations to
reform and finance the State's remedial programs, including the State
Superfund Program. The final report is entitled "Recommendations to Reform and Finance New York's Remedial Programs" and discusses six general program areas:
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The Report was released as a final draft on April 30, 1999 for public review and comment. The public comment period ended May 24, 1999. During the public comment period, public meetings were held in New York City and Buffalo to discuss the draft report and to receive oral comments. Appended to this report is a responsiveness summary developed by the Department of Environmental Conservation to address comments received during the public comment period. All pieces of the final report are provided online, with exception of Appendix C. This Appendix contains comments and letters from the public, and includes transcripts of the public meetings. Appendix C is available in hard copy from Larry Ennist at the address and phone number listed below. Printed Copies of the Final Report may be obtained from:
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This page was last updated 7/24/01
Excerpts of key Report sections are reproduced below:
The existing Superfund liability provisions are fundamentally sound, and the Working Group recommends leaving them essentially unchanged. The Group does recommend incorporating some common-sense reforms that have been used by the federal Superfund program for years. These reforms would properly focus liability on the true polluters and, by freeing innocent parties from liability, create strong incentives for thorough site investigations and voluntary cleanups, making brownfields redevelopment competitive with "greenfield" development. The reforms would not relieve polluters of any financial or legal responsibility. The Group also recommends granting DEC authority to collect costs plus treble damages from polluters that have acted in bad faith and, after a reasonable period of time, refused to clean up a site, forcing the State to fund the cleanup.
"Strict, joint and
several" liability is the existing standard for parties liable to
clean up contaminated property under both New York and federal law. "Strict"
liability means that a party's liability is not based on fault. "Joint and
several" liability means that when more than one
responsible party exists for a site, any and all parties may be held
responsible for the entire cost of cleanup.
Liability is retroactive:
parties are liable if the contamination warrants cleanup, regardless of
whether the contamination was created previously, possibly at a time when
the activities that led to the contamination were legal and prior to
enactment of State and federal cleanup liability statutes.
The federal Superfund law imposes liability on four classes of people:
the owner or operator of a facility;
the owner or operator of a facility at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance;
any person who arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged for transport for disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance;
any person who accepted a hazardous substance for transport for disposal or treatment to a facility selected by such person.
The State Superfund law imposes liability on two classes of people
the owner of a site, and
"any person responsible for the disposal of hazardous wastes at such site" as determined by "applicable principles of statutory or common law liability."
The federal law regarding
petroleum cleanups is the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which holds
the owner or operator of an onshore facility or pipeline liable for
cleanups. A third-party whose conduct actually caused the discharge can also
be treated as a responsible party under specific circumstances.
The State law regarding petroleum
cleanups imposes liability "strictly" and "without regard to fault" on "any
person who has discharged petroleum." The statute also imposes such
liability on the Oil Spill Fund. The courts have interpreted this provision
broadly, holding liable parties such as the seller and installer of an oil
tank, an oil broker and the oil supplier to a leaking home heating oil tank.
These liability provisions have
obvious merits but also a significant unintended consequence: they act as a
powerful barrier to private investment in any site with a history of
contamination (regardless of its cleanup status), and they can capture
innocent parties in the net of liability unfairly, often providing the
responsible parties with opportunities to delay cleanups while courtroom
battles determine responsibility.
DEC currently provides limited
releases from liability to volunteers who complete a satisfactory cleanup of
a site under the Voluntary Cleanup Program. Volunteers who do so
are released from future liability for the site's investigation and
remediation, subject to a number of reopeners.
The existing State liability standard contributes to the dereliction of contaminated sites because the party that is actually responsible for the contamination often abandons the property in an effort to escape liability, and no other party is willing to clean it up and return it to productive use because of the threat of being held liable for preexisting contamination. These brownfields remain blights on the community, providing a continuing source of pollution, while draining tax revenues and jobs from urban neighborhoods.
The Working Group's goal for
recommending changes in liability is to encourage non-responsible parties to
take ownership of, clean up and redevelop contaminated sites with private
funds. Some reforms would relieve some parties of liability for problems
they did not cause, but would not relieve actual polluters of any financial
or legal responsibility. The Working Group recommends retaining the
"polluter pays" principle: the party responsible for the contamination
should pay for the cleanup.
The proposed reforms should make
brownfields redevelopment competitive with "greenfield" development, and act
as an engine for economic development in blighted areas.
The Working Group does recommend
that New York adopt liability limitations and exemptions (listed below)
contained in the federal Superfund program that have proven to be fair and
feasible in an attempt to retain liability for polluters and to relieve
innocent owners of some liability.
For example, New York State
currently does not provide similar liability protections to lenders that the
Federal government provides, meaning banks are less willing to provide
funding for clean up and redevelopment of contaminated properties in New
York. The lender liability exemption proposed by the Working Group would
apply only to banks that did not participate in the management of the site
when the contamination occurred.
In addition, the lender or
prospective purchaser must make a good faith effort to determine whether a
site is contaminated to receive this exemption, creating a powerful
incentive for banks and prospective purchasers to conduct thorough
environmental investigations before properties are sold.
As an incentive to clean up a
site, the Working Group recommends that the Attorney General give liability
releases to parties conducting cleanups under all three programs. The State
would reserve its right to pursue these parties for cleanup costs if it is
determined that the cleanup was not done appropriately, or in cases of fraud
or other traditional "reopener" situations described on the following page.
These liability limitations and
exemptions would be carefully structured to maintain liability on true
polluters while encouraging innocent parties to clean up and redevelop these
sites.
The Working Group
recommends incorporating the following liability limitations and exemptions
that are offered under the federal Superfund program:
(1) Innocent Party Defense
-- To establish innocence, a party must establish that contamination was
caused by an act of war, God, or some other person that was not affiliated
contractually with the party; that it exercised due care with respect to the
contamination; and it took precautions against foreseeable acts of other
persons.
(2) Lender Liability
Exemption -- for lenders who do not participate in the management of a
site; if the lender forecloses on a property, the lender must divest of the
property as soon as practicable.
(3) Fiduciary Liability
Limitation -- liable for cleanup up to the amount of the assets held in
a fiduciary capacity.
(4) Municipal Liability
Exemption -- for property taken involuntarily (e.g. tax delinquency).
(5) De Minimis and De
Micromis Liability Protection -- DEC should adopt de minimis (small
parties) and de micromis (very small parties) settlement policies allowing
qualifying parties to resolve their liability through settlements that are
in proportion to the harm they have caused.
The Working Group also recommends
the following additional liability limitations:
Industrial Development Agency
Exemption -- This protection is not codified in the federal Superfund
statute but relies on case law. An IDA acting as a "conduit financier" would
not be considered an owner or operator of the site.
Prospective Purchaser
Liability Protection -- Instead of incorporating EPA's prospective
purchaser liability limitation, New York's Voluntary Cleanup Program offers
the same protection: liability exemption while the investigation is being
conducted, however, the liability exemption would be lost if the property
was left in worse condition.
Liability Releases --
Offered to parties successfully completing cleanups; to be issued
by the Attorney General's Office. The liability release is transferrable,
and would be invalidated in case of the following "reopeners" (which
incorporate the conditions of the Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act's
Brownfields program):
(1) fraud;
(2) failure to comply with the agreement or consent order with DEC;
(3) change in use which results in the need to conduct additional remediation;
(4) causing or threatening to cause a release of a contaminant at the property after the consent order or agreement;
(5) conditions unknown to DEC at the time the release that require additional remediation;
(6) the cleanup is not protective
of public health or the environment.
Incentives to Clean
Up Sites to Unrestricted Use Levels
The Working Group recommends that
the State provide a liability release without reopeners 3 and 6 above to
non-responsible parties that clean up to Soil Category 1 soil cleanup
levels, and, further, if the site is not protective of public health and the
environment in the future, the State will remediate the site to that level
and pursue cost recovery against responsible parties. This strategy is
consistent with the incentives used by Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act's
Brownfields Program. This should encourage non-responsible parties to clean
up to Soil Category 1 in the first instance. For responsible parties that
remediate a site to Soil Category 1, reopener 3 above will not apply.
Treble Damages -- The Working Group recommends granting DEC authority to collect treble damages (three times the cleanup cost) from a responsible party that, after a reasonable period of time, refuses to remediate the property and the State is forced to fund the cleanup.
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