Case Study of How NOT to Run a Voluntary Cleanup Program

Introduction

The concerns raised throughout this article are real and growing worse.  Brownfield seminars across New York State have become somber events that have increasingly devolved into forums for exchanging horror stories and venting frustrations.  There is no sign of the pumped-up public and private sector professionals who, in other parts of the country, reinvigorate themselves by working together to convert blighted brownfields into productive and non-polluting landmarks to teamwork and progress.  The mood here is dramatically different from that in other jurisdictions—where federal and state brownfields officials and practitioners are full of energy and enthusiasm because they feel that they are doing something meaningful and socially beneficial. 

I won’t try to explain (because I can’t) the political and social dynamics that have led the New York brownfields program to go so horribly awry and that continue to take it two steps back for every forward step.  However, I will attempt to give the New York Brownfields and Voluntary Cleanup program enough concreteness, through a case study, to allow the reality of the problem to seep through.  Hopefully, it will make the path to a solution more clear as well. 

The problem with the voluntary cleanup program is all of the things the reform-minded Governor Pataki enumerated several years ago—and promised to root out of New York State (except where anyone thought it might compromise public health or the environment): too much regulating, intolerable bureaucracy, slow cynical attitudes of the past, government not acting as it should, etc., etc.  The solution, as so many other states have learned, is a more streamlined and accelerated cleanup program, where volunteerism is rewarded not penalized, where the goal is incremental improvement not unerring perfection, and where government leaders strive to empower their subordinates to do good and achieve results rather than placing them on leashes and enshrouding in them in red-tape to avoid the possibility of error or criticism.

The following case study is true and the essential details have been preserved without embellishment or distortion.  Names have been changed and details have been obscured—hopefully enough to avoid retaliation.  The issues are serious, but the tone is light-hearted with an occasional dose of good-natured sarcasm (Jonathan Swift was always easier to read than Richard Nixon).